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Abstract: Thomas Reid distinguished between natural and artificial 
language and argued that natural language has a very specific sort 
of priority over artificial language. This paper critically interprets 
Reid’s discussion, extracts a Reidian explanatory argument for the 
priority of natural language, and places Reid’s thought in the broad 
tradition of Cartesian linguistics.
1. Introduction
Noam Chomsky’s  work  on human language  reignited a  dormant 
tradition of studying language as a way of revealing something im­
portant about human nature (Chomsky 1957). Chomsky traces the 
roots  of  his  approach back through Wilhelm von Humboldt  and 
Rene Descartes (Chomsky 1966). This tradition  — what Chomsky 
calls  Cartesian linguistics — treats the creative human use of lan­
guage as especially noteworthy, in two senses. On the one hand, the 
available evidence seems woefully inadequate to account for the lin­
guistic competence humans acquire.  On the other hand, humans 
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routinely invent novel ways of expressing themselves, which other 
humans have little difficulty understanding, despite the novelty.
Thomas Reid fits comfortably into this tradition. Reid thought 
that language ought to be studied because doing so promises “to lay 
open some of the first principles of human nature” and in particular 
the human mind (Reid 1764: 51). One purpose of this paper is to 
demonstrate, through a careful analysis of Reid’s central argument 
in this area, how naturally Reid fits into the Cartesian linguistic tra­
dition. Another purpose is to identify the most plausible version of 
Reid’s  argument,  which  complements  Chomsky’s  own  important 
conclusions about human nature. Reid’s discussion of human lan­
guage,  in particular  his  distinction between natural  and artificial 
signs, also provides a model for his later discussion of human per­
ception (e.g. Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 190), and it would be fruitful to 
investigate how the conclusions drawn here might be extended to 
Reid’s views on perception. But I will not attempt that task here. It’s 
worth emphasizing at the outset that Reid’s philosophy of language 
has received scant attention in the secondary literature,1 and the 
central passages and argument I discuss at great length below have 
previously received no attention.
1 As an indication of this, consider that the index to  The Cambridge Com­
panion  to  Thomas  Reid  doesn’t  even  contain  an  entry  for  ‘language’ 
(though it does have one for Reid’s interest in botany!), and contains only a 
meagre entry for ‘signs’. Compare that to the multiple entries for ‘language’ 
and extensive entry for ‘signs’ in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, 
and the extensive entry for ‘language’ in  The Cambridge Companion to  
Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”. Moreover, the Berke­
ley  Companion dedicates an entire chapter to Berkeley’s theory of signs, 
and the Locke Companion dedicates a chapter to Locke’s philosophy of lan­
guage. (But compare Jensen 1979 and Castagnetto 1992.)
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In what follows I critically  interpret  and evaluate a principal 
distinction and argument due to Reid.  The distinction and argu­
ment occur in the following passage, from Chapter 4 of Reid’s  In­
quiry into the Human Mind:2
By language I understand all those signs which mankind use 
in order to communicate to others their thoughts and inten­
tions,  their  purposes  and desires.  And  such  signs  may  be 
conceived to be of two kinds: First, such as have no meaning, 
but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among 
those who use them; these are artificial signs: Secondly, such 
as,  previous to all  compact or agreement,  have a meaning 
which every man understands by the principles of his nature. 
Language,  so  far  as  it  consists  of  artificial  signs,  may  be 
called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, I call it 
natural.
Having premised these definitions, I think it is demon­
strable,  that  if  mankind had  not  a  natural  language,  they 
could never have invented an artificial one by their reason 
and  ingenuity.  For  all  artificial  language  supposes  some 
compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain 
signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements be­
fore the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or 
2 Since Immerwahr 1978, some have accepted that Reid’s views changed sig­
nificantly between his early work in the Inquiry and his later work in the 
Essays. I reject this reading of Reid, but it isn’t necessary to belabor the 
point here, because I am focused on Reid’s interesting and neglected dis­
cussion in the Inquiry.
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agreement without signs, nor without language; and there­
fore there must be a natural  language before any artificial 
language can be invented: Which was to be demonstrated. 
(Reid 1764: section 4.2, p. 51)
My subsequent  discussion divides into three  parts.  Section 2 
considers Reid’s distinction between artificial and natural signs in 
the first quoted paragraph. Section 3 considers several ways of un­
derstanding the argument in the second quoted paragraph. Section 
4  advances  a  different  interpretation  of  Reid’s  discussion,  and 
relates it to Chomsky’s views on grammar.
2. The distinction
On Reid’s view, human language is the set of signs humans use “in 
order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their 
purposes and desires.” Reid divides these signs, and by extension 
language, into two categories: natural and artificial. Artificial signs 
are defined as those signs which have no meaning except for “what 
is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use 
them.” The English word ‘star’ is an example of an artificial sign. It 
refers to stars because we agree that it will. The “thumbs­up” sign in 
Western societies  signals  approval  because  we  agree  that  it  will. 
Natural signs are defined as those signs which, prior to any “com­
pact or agreement, have a meaning which every man understands 
by the principles of his  nature.”  Reid says natural  signs come in 
three basic types: “modulations of the voice, gestures, and features.” 
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Pointing is a gesture naturally understood as calling our attention 
to  the  thing ostended.  Raising  one’s  voice  while  furrowing one’s 
brow is naturally understood to signify anger.
Clearly this distinction between artificial  and natural  signs is 
mutually exclusive. That is, as defined, no sign can be both natural 
and artificial. Reid’s discussion strongly suggests that the distinc­
tion is also jointly exhaustive. That is, we’re led to believe that every 
sign,  respectively,  must  be  either  natural  or  artificial.  If  Reid 
thought there were other categories, then he would have said so.
But  it’s  doubtful  that  the  distinction is  jointly  exhaustive.  At 
least, we have no reason to suppose that all signs fall into one or the 
other category. The primary reason for this is that Reid defines a 
natural sign as one that  every human naturally understands. But 
surely there might be signs whose meaning some, but not all, hu­
mans  understand naturally.  To  use  an  example  that  Reid  might 
have acknowledged, it is often said that identical twins have an un­
canny ability to interpret one another. Perhaps this is due to experi­
ence, or perhaps it’s a natural talent they have in virtue of their in­
timately intertwined origins. It’s readily conceivable that such a pair 
is born with a natural ability to signal their moods and interpret one 
another,  in  virtue  of  their  tone,  gestures  and  features,  in  ways 
unique  to  them.  (For  example  recall  Poe’s  Fall  of  the  House  of  
Usher, where we’re told that “sympathies of a scarcely intelligible 
nature  had  always  existed  between”  the  twins  Roderick  and 
Madeline Usher. Signs unintelligible to others are perfectly intelli­
gible to the twins.) These signs used by such twins would be neither 
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artificial nor natural, as per Reid’s definitions. Neither would such 
signs violate the Wittgensteinian prohibition on private language, 
which  pertains  to  language  that  is  essentially private.  Not  only 
would the twins’  use not be essentially private,  it  is trivially true 
that it doesn’t even count as contingently private, since it’s used in 
common by two people.
Setting  aside  examples  that  Reid  himself  might  have  con­
sidered,  drawing  on  evolutionary  theory,  we  might  even  expect 
there to be many partially distributed natural tendencies to express 
states of mind in specific ways. For example suppose that touching 
your ear while speaking was reliably associated with an especially 
sincere commitment to truth­telling.3 A genetic mutation, resulting 
in a disposition to both (a) touch your ear as an expression of such a 
commitment and (b) to interpret such behavior likewise in others, 
might  confer  an  advantage  on  those  with  the  mutation.  Such  a 
mutation would at first be unique, and then, with any luck, propag­
ate throughout the population over time, though it might never be 
universally distributed. Such a sign would count as neither artificial 
nor natural, as per Reid’s definitions, but surely it’s a sign nonethe­
less.
Reid could respond in at least two ways. On the one hand, he 
might add a third category to accommodate the examples. On the 
other hand, he might revise the definition of ‘natural sign’, so as to 
include such signs as natural.  Call  this  an inclusive definition of 
3 Suppose this commitment to be well beyond the default commitment to 
truth­telling  embodied  in  Reid’s  “principle  of  veracity.”  See  Reid  1764: 
6.24, p. 193–4. 
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‘natural  sign’.  An inclusive  definition  might  go  like  this:  natural 
signs have a meaning prior to any agreement among those who use 
them,  which  meaning  those  people  understand  by  principles  of 
their nature. This creates space for the sort of idiosyncratic  or par­
tially distributed natural signs featured in our examples. Perhaps 
the  difference  between  these  two  responses  doesn’t  amount  to 
much. But I favor the inclusive response, for two reasons. First, the 
people in our examples – the twins in the one case, the mutants in 
the other – do express and understand the signs in question “by 
principles of their nature.” That makes it natural to include them as 
“natural  signs,”  and  so  I  shall.  Second,  the  inclusive  definition 
seems best suited to Reid’s argument, to which we now turn.
3. The argument
Here’s the heart of the relevant passage again:
[I]t is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural lan­
guage, they could never have invented an artificial one. All 
artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to 
affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must 
be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; 
but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor 
without language; and therefore there must be a natural lan­
guage before any artificial language can be invented: Which 
was to be demonstrated.
Reid speaks here of artificial and natural “language.” This can be 
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misleading, at least to modern ears, since we tend to associate “lan­
guage” with robust communication systems, replete with syntactical 
and semantic rules, like French or Chinese. But as we saw earlier, 
by “language” Reid refers to all signs we use in order to communic­
ate, not just the verbal signs associated with what we typically call a 
“language.” So I will interpret his argument accordingly.
Something along roughly  the following lines seems to be the 
most natural interpretation of Reid’s argument.
1. Humans invented artificial signs. (Assumption)
2. The invention of artificial signs requires earlier  agreement 
among those who invented them. (Premise)
3. There  can  be  no  agreement  without  the  use  of  signs. 
(Premise)
4. So  among  themselves  humans  earlier  used  signs,  whose 
meaning preceded the invention of artificial signs. (From 1–
3)
5. Signs whose meaning precedes the use of artificial signs are 
natural signs. (Premise)
6. So  among  themselves  humans  earlier  used  natural  signs. 
(From 4–5)
7. So  if  humans  invented  artificial  signs,  then  among 
themselves they earlier used natural signs. (From 1–6)
Line 1 is an assumption for conditional proof, and so isn’t subject to 
question. Lines 2 and 5 are supported by the definitions of ‘artificial 
sign’ and ‘natural sign’. Line 3 is, I presume, supposed to be obvi­
ous. The inference to 6 is obviously valid, as is the inference to 7. By 
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‘use’  I  intend ‘meaningful  use’,  which should dispel  any question 
about the validity of the inference to 4.
Now we can see why I earlier claimed that the inclusive defini­
tion of ‘natural sign’ better suits Reid’s argument. It’s implausible 
that the invention of artificial signs among, say, a small group of 
people in South America requires these people to reach prior agree­
ment by using signs that all humans naturally understand by prin­
ciples of their nature. It suffices that the small group reaches prior 
agreement by using signs that they understand. It’s simply irrelev­
ant  whether  some  other  people  in,  say,  central  Asia,  whom  our 
South Americans never have and never will meet, would likewise 
understand  those  signs.  Even  supposing  that  the  central  Asians 
wouldn’t  understand,  that  doesn’t  prevent  our  South  Americans 
from using the signs to agree among themselves.
Next I will present an objection to Reid’s argument. This will be 
followed by a series of imagined replies, refinements and rebuttals. 
This process will enable a better appreciation of Reid’s argument, 
and help us to decide whether Reid’s conclusion, or something in 
the ballpark, is true.
We do not by a principle of our nature understand ‘wolves’ to 
refer to wolves. The word ‘wolves’ is not a sign in natural human 
language. And yet it certainly seems possible that a human, call him 
‘Wally’,  might decide to use ‘wolves’  in order  to communicate  to 
others his thought that wolves lurk nearby. This invention of this 
artificial sign didn’t require prior agreement using natural signs. So 
premise 2 is false.
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“Oh, but it did require agreement,” it might be replied. “Wally 
had to agree with himself to use ‘wolves’ to refer to wolves.” In re­
sponse, if we’re to count such a decision as an agreement with one­
self, then premise 3 is false. One doesn’t communicate such a de­
cision to oneself.  One doesn’t use signs in order to communicate 
such a decision to oneself. Neither does one need to use signs to 
make such a decision.
Perhaps  it  will  instead  be  replied,  “We  should  understand 
Reid’s argument to pertain not merely to the invention of artificial 
signs, but the invention and use of them.” This reply can be met by 
extending the example. Suppose Wally says ‘wolves’ to a Stranger 
he encounters along the forest trail one evening, in order to com­
municate to his thought that wolves lurk nearby. Nothing here re­
quires prior agreement on the meaning of ‘wolves’ between Wally 
and the Stranger, or between Wally and anyone else.
Perhaps it will instead be replied, “We should understand the 
argument  to pertain to  the  invention and  effective interpersonal 
use of artificial signs. The Stranger will just be confused by Wally’s 
utterance, so it doesn’t count as an effective interpersonal use of ar­
tificial signs.” This reply can be met by extending the example. Add 
that the Stranger hails from a community that, as it happens, uses 
the word ‘wolves’ to refer to wolves. So she isn’t the least bit con­
fused by Wally’s utterance. She immediately takes him to mean pre­
cisely  what  he  does  mean.  (Perhaps  she  falsely,  but  reasonably, 
takes Wally to be a member of her community, despite having never 
seen him before.)
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“But notice,” it might be replied, “that your latest extension of 
the case requires that the Stranger’s community previously agreed 
to use ‘wolves’ that way. So the example doesn’t threaten a suitably 
modified version of Reid’s argument. The invention and effective 
interpersonal use of artificial signs requires agreement among some 
people or other.” Fair enough. This reply can be met by modifying 
the example as follows. Instead of hailing from a community that 
uses ‘wolves’ to refer to wolves, our Stranger, like Wally, made the 
individual  decision  to  use  ‘wolves’  to  refer  to  wolves.  She is  ab­
sorbed in thought when Wally abruptly says ‘wolves’ to her. She im­
mediately  takes  him to  mean precisely  what  he  does  mean,  and 
takes precautions against the potential danger lurking nearby. None 
of this requires prior agreement between Wally and the Stranger.
“But  the  Stranger  has  no  good  reason  to  expect  that  Wally 
refers to wolves when he says ‘wolves’!” it might be objected. “She 
might unreasonably believe him to be referring to wolves, but she 
doesn’t  know that he’s referring to wolves. This is no  witting and 
effective interpersonal use of artificial language, which is what we 
should take Reid to be concerned with.”  This last objection gains 
some measure of credibility when we consider three things. In the 
first place, consider a later passage from the Inquiry where Reid re­
capitulates the argument already quoted:
It appears evident from what hath been said on the subject of 
language, That there are natural signs, as well as artificial; 
and particularly, That the thoughts, purposes, and disposi­
tions of the mind, have their natural signs in the features of 
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the face, the modulation of the voice, and the motion and at­
titude of the body: That without a natural knowledge of the 
connection between these signs, and the things signified by 
them, language could never have been invented and estab­
lished among men: and . . . this connec­tion . . . we may call  
the natural language of mankind. (1764: 5.3, p. 59)
Here  Reid  seems  to  characterize  natural  language  in  terms  of 
knowing the connection between sign and signified.4 It stands to 
reason, then, that he’d characterize the effective interpersonal use 
of artificial language in terms of knowing the connection between 
sign and signified.
In the second place, careful inspection reveals that the conclu­
sion Reid ultimately draws is stronger than what he initially says he 
would prove. Initially he says, “It is demonstrable, that if mankind 
had not a natural language, they could never have invented an arti­
ficial one by their reason and ingenuity.” Call this the initial state­
ment of Reid’s thesis. But when presenting the actual argument, he 
concludes, “Therefore there must be a natural language before any 
artificial language can be invented: Which is what was to be demon­
4 There is a close affinity between what Reid calls “natural signs” and what 
Grice calls “natural meaning.” To illustrate natural meaning, Grice used the 
example  “those spots  mean measles”  (1957).  To  illustrate  natural  signs, 
Reid used examples such as “smoke is a natural sign of fire” and a certain 
countenance  on a  human  face  is  “a  natural  sign  of  anger”  (1764:  177). 
Reid’s “natural language of mankind” might thus be regarded as a subset of 
Gricean natural meaning, where the signs in question are those features of 
human behavior and countenance that signify one’s state of mind. But as I 
discuss in the main text, Reid might impose a further epistemic constraint 
on which natural signs are fit for inclusion in natural human language.
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strated.”  Call  this  the  final  statement of  Reid’s  thesis.  The  final 
statement entails the initial statement, but not vice versa. (That is, 
the final statement is logically stronger.) If we cannot invent artifi­
cial language without an antecedent natural language, then we can­
not  by  our  reason  and  ingenuity  –  or,  more  generally,  by  any 
means whatsoever – invent artificial language without prior agree­
ment via natural language. Perhaps Reid intended us to read the fi­
nal statement of the thesis as implicitly qualified, in light of the ini­
tial statement.
In the third place, later in the same section, Reid says that we 
could not, by all our “wit and ingenuity” alone, invent artificial lan­
guage without a prior natural language, apparently simply reiterat­
ing what he takes himself to have proven.
In light of these three considerations, it is at least plausible that 
Reid intended to conclude only that we cannot wittingly invent arti­
ficial  language without  prior  agreement via  natural  language.  To 
wittingly invent an artificial sign is to invent a sign, knowing what it 
signifies.
This is an interesting objection, which leads us in a potentially 
promising direction. But first notice that it doesn’t fully deliver on 
what our critic initially promised. Even accepting the weaker inter­
pretation of the argument, featuring the initial statement of Reid’s 
thesis, we may not conclude that Reid was concerned with the wit­
ting and effective interpersonal  use of artificial language. He liter­
ally speaks only of the invention – the witting invention, if you like 
– of artificial language. This thesis succumbs to our initial example, 
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wherein  Wally  decides  to  use  ‘wolves’  to  refer  to  wolves.  Surely 
there’s no problem supposing that he wittingly does so. Indeed, this 
is the natural understanding of the case. It would be odd to suggest 
that despite consciously deciding to use ‘wolves’ that way, he never­
theless doesn’t know that he does so. So even taking into account 
the emphasis on knowledge found elsewhere, we still must substan­
tially depart from the letter of the text in order to focus on the wit­
ting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language.
But let’s set aside, for the moment at least, any concern about 
literal fidelity to Reid’s text. Having come this far, it’s worth asking 
whether this Reidian thesis – I don’t say  Reid’s thesis  – is true. I 
suspect that even this thesis is false. To substantiate this suspicion, 
we must construct a new example, involving onomatopoeia.
We do not,  by  a  principle  of  our nature,  understand the cry 
‘owooo’ to mean anything. The cry ‘owooo’ is not a sign in natural 
human language. And yet it certainly seems possible that a human 
with some experience with wolves, call him ‘Howie’, might decide to 
use the cry ‘owooo’ in order to communicate to others his thought 
that wolves lurk nearby. The invention of this artificial sign didn’t 
require prior agreement using natural signs. And it seems quite nat­
ural that Howie would settle on this artificial sign for wolves, having 
learned that wolves uniquely cry ‘owooo’ in that distinctive sort of 
way, which anyone who has heard a wolf howl would recognize.
Suppose  Howie  is  exiting  the  forest  along  the  main  path  at 
dusk, having just escaped a ravenous wolf pack, when he notices a 
Stranger entering the forest. Howie knows that wolves lurk nearby, 
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and howls ‘owooo’ at the Stranger, in order to communicate this 
thought.  Moreover,  Howie  knows  that  any  human  adult  around 
these parts  knows what  a  wolf  howl sounds like.  So it  stands to 
reason  that  the  Stranger  would  interpret  Howie  as  referring  to 
wolves.  And the Stranger  interprets  him precisely that  way.  This 
certainly seems to qualify as a witting and effective interpersonal 
use of artificial language. But it wasn’t preceded by any agreement, 
using natural signs or otherwise, between Howie and the Stranger.5
Thus, in addition to concluding that Reid’s original distinction 
requires improvement, that Reid’s original argument fails, and that 
Reid’s original thesis is false, I also conclude that the qualified Re­
idian thesis under consideration is false too. The invention of artifi­
cial signs does not strictly require prior agreement via natural lan­
guage, and neither does the witting and effective interpersonal use 
of artificial signs.
4. An explanatory hypothesis
My critique  of  Reid relied on possible  but  highly  peculiar  cases, 
some involving coincidences that we couldn’t reasonably expect to 
occur frequently. But if we want to account for the highly systematic 
5 Earlier we noted a similarity between Reidian natural signs and Gricean 
natural meaning. The present example highlights a further similarity, this 
time in terms of Reidian “artificial signs” and Gricean “nonnatural mean­
ing.” Gricean nonnatural meaning can be glossed as follows: a speaker S’s 
utterance U means that P because of S’s intention that his audience infer,  
based on the fact that S uttered U, that S intends them to infer that S be­
lieves that P (and perhaps also that S intends them to infer that P in part 
because S believes that P). See Grice 1957 and 1969. Howie has a Gricean 
reflexive communicative intention.
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and stable institution that is artificial human language, it seems un­
likely that we’ll be satisfied with an appeal to such coincidences, es­
pecially in the quantity that would be required from a thorough ac­
counting. It is in the spirit of Reid’s original discussion, then, that I 
offer the following hypothesis.
Artificial human languages are frequently invented. Inventing a 
systematic and stable language no doubt takes time and effort, but 
it isn’t especially difficult  — as Reid puts it, “there is no great in­
genuity required” — for a group of humans to fairly quickly settle on 
a stable and extensible set of signs for the purposes of communicat­
ing  among  themselves.  This  is  true  even  if  they  are  complete 
strangers who initially don’t share a single artificial sign in com­
mon. The best explanation for the relative ease with which such hu­
mans can invent an artificial language is that they share a natural 
language which they can readily implement to agree on meanings 
for artificial signs. For example, pointing to something and saying 
‘apple’ in a clear, steady voice and then proceeding to do the same 
with several other objects that superficially resemble the first is an 
especially effective way to get a group of humans to understand that 
you’re using ‘apple’ to refer to things of that kind.
We thus have a Reidian explanatory argument for the existence 
of a natural human language. This language seems an especially apt 
tool  for  establishing a  common vocabulary.  It  thus  complements 
Chomsky’s explanatory argument for the existence of innate gram­
matical principles. On Chomsky’s view, the best explanation of how 
easily human children learn the grammatical rules of artificial lan­
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guage is that we have innate knowledge of the most fundamental 
grammatical  principles  underlying all  artificial  human languages. 
Likewise on the Reidian view, the best explanation of how easily hu­
mans can invent,  from scratch,  a common vocabulary  is that we 
share a natural tendency to interpret some gestures and expressions 
to signify certain things. Putting Chomsky and Reid together: the 
“original constitution of our minds” equips us with the tools for ac­
quiring  both  the  grammar and  lexicon of  artificial  human  lan­
guages.
Not only are artificial human languages easily  invented,  they 
are effortlessly maintained. This points to a further “original prin­
ciple of the human constitution,” namely, that there is “in the hu­
man mind an early anticipation, neither derived from experience, 
nor from reason, nor from any compact or promise, that our fellow­
creatures will” continue using words and other signs in the same 
way they previously have (Reid 1764: ch. 6.24, p. 193). Thus we are 
led to posit a further fascinating feature of the human mind, if we 
are to account for the effortless  stability of  artificial  human lan­
guages.6
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